Why Biden’s Ukraine Win Was Zelensky’s Loss – Casson Living – World News, Breaking News, International News

Why Biden’s Ukraine Win Was Zelensky’s Loss – Casson Living – World News, Breaking News, International News

When Russia initiated its invasion of Ukraine almost three years ago, President Joe Biden outlined three primary objectives for the U.S. response. Notably absent from these goals was the aspiration for a Ukrainian victory. The administration conveyed its commitment through the vague phrase of supporting Ukraine “for as long as it takes,” leaving many to ponder the exact outcomes this support was intended to achieve.

“We deliberately chose not to engage in discussions about territorial specifics,” says Eric Green, a former member of Biden’s National Security Council who oversaw Russia policy during that period. Essentially, the U.S. did not promise to assist Ukraine in reclaiming all territories lost to Russia, especially the vast regions in eastern Ukraine and Crimea, which were annexed during the 2014 invasion. Green points out that the White House believed such ambitions were beyond Ukraine’s capacity, even with significant Western aid. “That scenario was unlikely to yield a successful outcome. The main objective was to ensure Ukraine remained a sovereign, democratic nation, free to pursue its integration with the West.”

This formed one of the three objectives Biden established. The second involved maintaining unity among the U.S. and its allies, while the third aimed at avoiding any direct confrontation between Russia and NATO. Reflecting on his leadership throughout the Ukrainian conflict—a situation likely to shape his legacy—Biden has effectively achieved these three aims. However, meeting these limited goals has not brought satisfaction, even among his closest allies and advisers. “Unfortunately, it’s the kind of success that leaves one feeling unfulfilled,” Green remarked in an interview with TIME. “The suffering endured by Ukraine and the uncertainty surrounding the eventual resolution weigh heavily on everyone.”

As the conflict has unfolded, Ukrainian disappointment with Biden has grown increasingly vocal, particularly following the U.S. presidential elections that saw Donald Trump emerge victorious. In a podcast released in early January, President Volodymyr Zelensky articulated that the U.S. has not done enough under Biden’s administration in terms of imposing sanctions on Russia or providing Ukraine with essential weapons and security assurances. “With all due respect to the United States and the administration,” Zelensky told Lex Fridman, “I don’t want to go through another experience like we did with Biden. I urgently request sanctions and weapons—right now.”

The directness of his comments is noteworthy, particularly given the substantial support the U.S. has provided to Ukraine during Biden’s presidency—totaling $66 billion in military aid alone since the Russian invasion began in February 2022, according to the U.S. State Department. When considering all forms of assistance approved by Congress for Ukraine’s economic, humanitarian, and other needs, the total reaches approximately $183 billion as of last September, as reported by Ukraine Oversight, a U.S. government watchdog formed in 2023 to oversee this aid.

However, Zelensky and some of his allies argue that the U.S. has shown excessive caution in confronting Russia, especially concerning a clear path to NATO membership for Ukraine. “It’s essential that we share a unified vision for Ukraine’s security future—within the E.U. and NATO,” the Ukrainian president stressed during his recent visit to the White House in September.

During that meeting, Zelensky presented Biden with an extensive list of requests he termed Ukraine’s “victory plan.” This plan not only sought an invitation to NATO but also called for significantly enhancing Ukraine’s military stance through a substantial influx of weaponry and the authorization for their use deep within Russian territory. By that time, Biden had declared he would not seek re-election, and the Ukrainians were hopeful that his status as a lame duck would empower him to make bolder decisions, partially to cement his foreign affairs legacy. “For us, his legacy represents a critical argument,” a senior member of Zelensky’s delegation expressed to TIME. “How will history judge you?”

The responses to these requests were varied. Regarding Ukraine’s NATO aspirations, Biden remained steadfast in his stance. However, he did authorize several actions that had previously been deemed too risky by the White House. In November, the U.S. granted Ukraine permission to use American missiles for strikes deep within Russian territory. By January, the Biden administration imposed severe sanctions on the Russian energy sector, including measures against Russia’s “shadow fleet” of tankers used to transport its oil.

Although these decisions did not fully meet Zelensky’s expectations, they allowed Biden to assert in his final foreign-policy address that the U.S. had accomplished its objectives in defending Ukraine. Nevertheless, he remained circumspect, avoiding promises that Ukraine would regain any additional territory or even endure the conflict’s conclusion. “So far, Russian President Vladimir Putin has not succeeded in subjugating Ukraine,” Biden stated in his January 13 address at the State Department. “Today, Ukraine remains a free and independent nation, with the potential—a potential for a promising future.”

The future envisioned by Zelensky and many Ukrainians involves a decisive defeat of Russia. However, Biden’s implicit message, as he rallied global support, was that defending Ukraine against Russia does not necessarily mean defeating Russia. Thus, it is unsurprising that such an ambitious goal remains out of reach for Zelensky.